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Abstract  
Companies face competitive advantages or disadvantages depending on a country’s national 
institutional setting. The question is whether and how companies with highly similar product 
markets and technologies are able to stay competitive if they are located in disadvantaged 
national institutional settings. Building on the Varieties of Capitalism approach, we analyze 
the effect of different national institutional settings on one important characteristic of a 
company’s organizational structure, the span of control of production supervisors. Through 
plant interviews, we generated a unique dataset of matched-pair engineering companies in 
Germany, Switzerland, the UK, and the U.S. The findings indicate that the span of control is 
an important mechanism of adjustment to national institutional settings. Production 
supervisors in companies producing in coherently coordinated market economy like Germany 
have on average a broader span of control than those in coherently liberal market economy 
like the U.S. However, in mixed institutional settings like Switzerland and the UK, we find 
companies with a broad and companies with a narrow span of control, thus indicating that 
companies have the strategic power to adjust with their own company-level institutions to 
either complementing or substituting national institutions.  
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INTRODUCTION  
Several studies in business and political economy argue that a country’s national institutional 
setting creates competitive advantages for particular industries (e.g., Whitley, 2007; Amable, 
2003; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Lundvall, 1992; Porter, 1990). Therefore, companies in different 
countries are expected to concentrate on different (sub-)sectors for which the particular 
national institutional setting is advantageous. In the UK or the U.S., for example, companies 
should focus on chemicals and the development of pharmaceuticals; in Germany companies 
should focus on metals, machinery, and platform enabling technologies (Akkermans, Castaldi 
& Los, 2009; Casper & Whitley, 2004).  
 However, in reality companies are not perfectly sorted according to national 
institutional setting. We find large, research-intensive pharmaceutical companies in Germany 
(e.g., Bayer) and successful manufacturing companies producing turbines and machinery in 
the U.S. (e.g., General Electric). Therefore, the question arises how companies that produce 
highly similar products and compete in the same (global) product markets adjust 
organizationally to different and possibly less favorable national institutional settings to still 
stay competitive.  
 Previous comparative literature already indicated that the span of control (number of 
employees per supervisor) is an important mechanism of companies to adjust to the national 
institutional setting (Mason, 2000; Finegold & Wagner, 1998; Maurice, Sellier & Silvestre, 
1986). Despite these valuable contributions, we still have an incomplete understanding of 
firstly, how companies adjust to more or less favorable and coherent national institutional 
settings and secondly, whether companies have a strategic choice in terms of shaping their 
company-level institutional setting with which they could complement or substitute national-
level institutions. 
  We examine these questions by theoretically analyzing how companies adjust 
themselves to different national institutional settings via their span of control. We argue that 
companies have a broad span of control when three functions are fulfilled: skill foundation, 
skill retention, and trust between the management and employees. National institutions can 
provide these three functions; however, companies can also substitute national institutions 
with their own, functionally equivalent company-level institutions. We, therefore, derive 
hypotheses about potential configurations of both national- and company-level institutions 
associated with different spans of control and test these hypotheses empirically with 
production plant data gathered through interviews in matched-pair engineering companies in 
Germany, Switzerland, the UK, and the U.S. We chose this set of countries to include a 
 3 
coherently liberal and a coherently coordinated market economy (the U.S. and Germany) 
according to the Varieties of Capitalism approach (Hall & Soskice, 2001) and two mixed 
countries that combine liberal and coordinated features to different extents (the UK and 
Switzerland).  
 Consistent with previous literature, we do find that matched-pair engineering companies 
differ substantially in their span of control of production supervisors, thus adjusting to the 
national-level institutional variables. However, only in coherently coordinated and coherently 
liberal market economy (Germany and the U.S.) all companies are of the same type of span of 
control. There is a consistent cluster of companies with a broad span of control in the 
coherently coordinated market economy and a consistent cluster of narrow span of control in 
the coherently liberal market economy. In the mixed countries (the UK and Switzerland), we 
find companies that have a broad and companies that have a narrow span of control.  
 By measuring the functionally equivalent institutions at the company level, we find that 
the institutional setting at the company level differ from the national institutional setting at the 
country level, thus explaining the different within-country results. Using the fuzzy-set 
qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA, Ragin, 2000, 2008), we show that the three 
functions skill foundation, skill retention, and trust are indeed all necessary conditions for a 
broad span of control and can be ensured by the company-level institutions high-quality 
vocational training, strong internal labor markets, and employee representations.  
  The paper contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, we provide answers 
to the question of how companies adjust to national institutional settings if these settings are 
not coherently favorable to their industry. To define whether an institutional setting is 
coherent and favorable, we use the VoC approach, thus taking into account Redding’s call for 
a “thick description” (Redding, 2005: 123) of institutions by providing a broad institutional 
view with a simultaneous analysis of several institutional variables (Jackson & Deeg, 2008). 
Second, we provide further evidence for the institutional diversity that is hidden beneath the 
macro-institutional evidence (Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop & Paunescu, 2010). To explore this 
institutional diversity, we analyze institutional configurations at two levels, the national and 
the company level. Third, we show how companies react with their company-level 
institutional setting and their span of control to their national institutional setting. This direct 
link between institutions and organizational outcomes is a major contribution as previous 
national-level analyses have been criticized of not being able to show that direct relationship 
(Allen, 2004).    
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES  
As shown by a large literature, national institutional settings generate industry-specific 
competitive advantages (Whitley, 2007; Amable, 2003; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Lundvall, 
1992; Porter, 1990). Our theorization is based on the Varieties of Capitalism approach (VoC, 
Hall & Soskice, 2001) one of the most influential approaches in this context and “state of the 
art of institutional analysis” (Howell, 2003). The VoC approach categorizes economies 
according to their institutions on a continuum between the two polar forms of coordinated and 
liberal market economies, with the U.S. and Germany as the most coherent examples.  
 Companies in coherently coordinated market economies (CMEs) such as Germany are 
embedded in a network of mediating institutions. CMEs are characterized by cooperative 
industrial relations systems within companies, strong collective bargaining across companies, 
strict employment protection, nationally regulated and high-quality vocational education and 
training (VET) systems, a high investment in vocational (rather than university) training, and 
financial systems that allow for long-term investment horizons for companies (Hall & 
Soskice, 2001: 21ff). As employees have a high level of vocational skills, acquire firm-
specific knowledge, and are involved in planning and troubleshooting, coherent CMEs 
provide competitive advantages for industries that are based on incremental innovation such 
as mechanical engineering (Hall & Soskice, 2001: 39ff).  
 Companies in coherently liberal market economies (LMEs) such as the U.S. rely on 
institutions such as markets and hierarchies. LME configurations are the reverse of the CME 
model: little cooperation within companies but strong management power, no (or, at most, 
company-based) collective bargaining, deregulated labor markets with weak employment 
protection, high (individual) investment in university training, and high stock market 
capitalization (Hall & Soskice, 2001: 27ff). Coherent LMEs provide competitive advantages 
for industries that rely on radical product innovations such as biotechnology and 
telecommunication, as companies can dismiss labor and close plants quickly and easily shift 
capital from one industry to another to invest in risky but potentially lucrative R&D projects 
in high-tech industries. The high percentage of university graduates provides a suitable 
workforce for these types of industries (Hall & Soskice, 2001: 40ff).  
 Empirical studies examine the VoC typology at the country level, either by clustering 
economies according to their institutional dimension (e.g. Schneider & Paunescu, 2012) or by 
using QCA methods (e.g. Kogut & Ragin, 2006) and links the VoC typology to the 
(innovation) success, mostly at the country- or industry-level (e.g., Schneider, Schulze-
Bentrop & Paunescu, 2010; Akkermans et al., 2009; Hall & Gingerich, 2009; Casper & 
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Whitley, 2004). However, most of these studies have neglected how companies with the same 
products can exist in different institutional settings.  
 Some studies on matched-pair companies have taken this aspect into consideration and 
identified the span of control as possible mechanism of organizational adjustment. As 
technology does not fully determine a company’s organizational structure (with span of 
control being one important aspect), Maurice, Sellier, and Silvestre (1986) argue that national 
training and educational systems play an important role because they influence the 
qualification level of the workforce and thereby the need for closer or looser supervision. The 
higher and broader the qualification level of the workforce is (“professionalization”), the less 
supervisory input will be required (Maurice, Sorge & Warner, 1980; Maurice, Sellier & 
Silvestre, 1986). Consistent with Maurice, Sorge and Warner’s results, Mason (2000) shows 
that German supervisors have a broader span of control than their counterparts in the UK and 
the U.S. (see also Finegold & Wagner, 1998). However, a differentiated analysis of the 
influence of institutional settings on the span of control still needs to be addressed. The 
country classifications of the VoC in terms of more or less coherent and favorable 
institutional settings provide the theoretical background suitable for the analysis.  
 Moreover, the company-level institutional perspective needs to be considered in greater 
detail. Companies may have strategic leeway to adjust to the national institutional setting 
either via their span of control or with the shape of their company-level, functionally 
equivalent institutions. Backes-Gellner (1996), for example, finds in her comparative study of 
matched-pair companies in four countries and four industries that different but functionally 
equivalent training strategies exist at the company level, thus ensuring the same company-
level stock of qualifications, which allows companies to produce similar products despite very 
different national institutional settings.  
 We argue that a focus on the company-level institutional setting is of special importance 
in hybrid national institutional settings because successful companies might need coherent 
institutions, be they at the national or at the company level. Coherence means that all 
institutions fit together (e.g., all are coordinated) and thus generate complementarities. 
Complementarity in this context means that the “functioning of one depends on and enhances 
the functioning of others” (Campbell & Pedersen, 2007: 311). According to the VoC 
approach, institutional complementarities are important for improving the functional 
capability of the institutional setting and, therefore, also for generating industry-specific 
comparative advantages (Hall & Soskice, 2001: 17ff). Also several empirical studies have 
supported the importance of coherence and complementary institutions (e.g., Hall & 
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Gingerich, 2009; Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop & Paunescu, 2010). We argue that these 
institutional complementarities can be built both at the national and the company level. Using 
the VoC approach, the following sections analyze theoretically which institutional 
configurations at the national and at the company level should be associated with a broad and 
with a narrow span of control. 
 
Institutions at the national level and the span of control 
Based on the VoC, we argue in this paper that the presence or absence of three functions 
determines the span of control of production companies: skill foundation, skill retention, and 
trust. Following the VoC, we analyze four national institutions—the vocational education and 
training (VET) system, wage coordination, employment protection, and employee 
representation—that fulfill three functions: laying a sound skill foundation, ensuring that 
skilled workers stay with the company, and making sure that workers have a trust relation 
with their companies and are motivated to use their skills in the interest of the company. The 
quality of the VET system determines whether (future) employees have the necessary 
production skills (function of skill foundation). Wage coordination on the labor market and 
the level of employment protection as part of an industrial relations system may either support 
or undermine a company’s effort to retain the production skills in the company (function of 
skill retention). The national regulation on employee representation influences the 
relationship between the company and its production employees and thus the way employees 
use their skills to advance the objectives of the company (function of trust). In sum, the shape 
of these four national institutions determines whether the three functions skill foundation, 
skill retention, and trust are fulfilled and thus also the type of the span of control of a 
company as explained in the following.  
 First, the better the VET system and thus the more skilled the employees in production 
are, the fewer supervisors should be necessary for supporting and monitoring them. Osterman 
(1994), for example, found in his U.S. study of the supervision intensity of blue collar core 
workers that the skill level of the employees is inversely associated with the amount of 
supervision they receive (see also Maurice, Sellier & Silvestre, 1986). Moreover, better-
qualified employees need less monitoring also because they can perform more demanding and 
interesting jobs and are thus more motivated. Therefore, we argue that a high-quality VET 
system lays the necessary skill foundation for a broad span of control. 
 Second, coordinated wage setting at the industry (or higher) level—showing a high 
level of employer coordination and a high degree of corporatism—supports long tenure and 
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strong internal labor markets. The positive relationship between coordinated wages and 
internal labor markets occurs because employer coordination reduces the danger that skilled 
labor will be poached (Culpepper, 2001) and reduces employees’ incentives for leaving the 
company as wages are equalized at “equivalent skill levels across an industry,” assuring 
workers “that they are receiving the highest feasible rates of pay in return for the deep 
commitments they are making to firms” (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 25). Similarly, high 
employment protection decreases employees’ incentive to change employers and increases 
their incentive to invest in company-specific knowledge (Estevez-Abe, Iversen & Soskice, 
2001; Wasmer, 2006). Long tenure and strong internal labor markets ensure a set of 
employees with company-specific knowledge, i.e., an excellent pool of production workers 
and (potential) supervisors who know the company inside out and can take high 
responsibility. Therefore, we argue that both coordinated wage setting and high levels of 
employment protection fulfill the function of skill retention and thus allow a broad span of 
control by ensuring that highly qualified employees remain in the company at different 
hierarchical levels (production workers and supervisors).  
 Finally, the existence of an employee representation should increase trust between the 
management and its employees. According to Hall and Soskice (2001: 24f), works councils 
provide “employees with security against arbitrary lay-offs or changes to their working 
conditions” and this security increases trust between management and production workers. A 
broad stream of literature has argued for the importance of employee representation for 
building trust and cooperation within the company (e.g., Holland et al., 2012; for works 
councils, e.g., Backes-Gellner, Frick & Sadowski, 1997; Frege, 2002). Since a broad span of 
control requires trust between workers and their supervisors to ensure that workers use their 
discretion in the interest of the company, we argue that an employment representation is 
necessary for a broad span of control.  
 As a high-quality VET system, coordinated wages, high employment protection, and 
strong employee representations (such as works councils) all apply to coherent CMEs and 
none of them apply to coherent LMEs, we expect a broad span of control in coherent CMEs 
but not in coherent LMEs, in which all of the foundations for a broad span of control are 
missing. Without skill foundation, skill retention, and trust, companies will instead have to 
apply narrow spans of control. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Companies in coherent LMEs show a narrower span of control 
than those in coherent CMEs.  
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Following the VoC approach in our empirical analysis, we use Germany as coherent CME, 
and the U.S. as coherent LME. 
 
In mixed countries, which are neither fully coherent LMEs nor fully coherent CMEs, only few 
complementarities between the different institutions exist. Thus, companies may adjust either 
with a broad or with a narrow span of control as none of them is clearly induced by the 
national institutional setting. Therefore, we expect to find both companies with a broad and 
companies with a narrow span of control and, therefore, a larger range in the spans of control 
of companies in mixed countries than in coherent countries. Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 2: In mixed economies we expect a larger range in the span of control 
than in coherent market economies. 
 
In our empirical analysis, we use Switzerland and the UK as examples for mixed economies. 
Even though the UK is often characterized as coherent LME (e.g. Schneider & Paunescu, 
2012), we show in the variable section that the UK is mixed when focusing on the four 
institutions that influence directly the span of control.  
 
Institutions at the company level and the span of control 
Although a country’s institutional setting provides an important framework, we argue that the 
company still has managerial choices about how to act within a given national framework and 
about how to design a coherent institutional setting at the company level. Therefore, we need 
to measure directly the functionally equivalent institutions at the company level.  
 The VET system at the national level may or may not be widely dispersed and of high 
quality. Companies can still choose whether to train their employees within the VET system 
and whether to train at a higher or lower quality. Therefore, we focus on the company-level 
existence and quality of the vocational training to directly measure whether the function of 
skill foundation is fulfilled.  
 Similarly, companies have alternatives to signal employment protection in case the 
national law does not prescribe it. We argue that companies in countries with low 
employment protection can build internal labor markets that provide reliable career options 
and employment security thus fulfilling the function of skill retention. Conversely, companies 
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can also have weak internal labor markets even though the national employment protection 
law is restrictive.  
 Country-level data on collective bargaining figures has become more and more a rough 
measure for general categorizations. Also comparatively high coverage levels by collective 
agreements at the national level do not necessarily mean that all industries and companies are 
covered by externally negotiated and wage-relevant bargaining agreements. Even the 
existence of an industry-level collective agreement does not automatically include binding 
wage regulations. The between-sector heterogeneity and the importance of exploring the 
contractual details thus increase the necessity to measure directly at the company-level 
whether an industry-wide and wage-relevant collective agreement exists.  
 Even though no or only weak legal regulations on employee representations may exit at 
the country level, still some company-level form of employee representation may exist 
(Gollan & Lewin, 2013) which can have a trust-increasing effect (Holland et al., 2012). We, 
therefore, measure directly whether some sort of company-level employee representation 
exists which could fulfill the trust function necessary for a broad span of control. Conversely, 
it may well be that companies have no employee representation such as a works council even 
though the company would have the necessary preconditions (Backes-Gellner, Mohrenweiser 
& Pull, 2011). 
 We particularly expect companies in mixed institutional settings to strive for company-
internal solutions to build a coherent company-level institutional setting. Companies can for 
example substitute national institutions of liberal shape with company-level institutions of 
coordinated shape, thus complementing existing coordinated national institutions. Since 
companies in mixed countries can choose to complement either the nationally existing 
coordinated or liberal institutions, we expect to find a broader variation of company-level 
institutional configurations in mixed countries than in coherent countries. We thus 
hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 3: For companies in mixed market economies we expect more 
configurations of company-level institutional settings than for companies in 
coherent market economies. 
 
Coherent institutional configurations lay the foundation for either a broad or a narrow span of 
control. A broad span of control needs all three functions (skill foundation, skill retention, and 
trust) and thus all company-level functional equivalents of a CME. Thus if a company’s 
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institutional setting resembles a coherent institutional configuration of the coordinated type, 
we expect a broad span of control. If a company resembles a coherent institutional 
configuration of the liberal type, it will only work with a narrow span of control. Thus, we 
derive a fourth and a fifth hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: For companies with a coherently coordinated company-level 
institutional configuration (coordinated in all institutional variables) we expect a 
broad span of control.  
Hypothesis 5: For companies with a coherently liberal company-level 
institutional configuration (liberal in all institutional variables) we expect a 
narrow span of control.  
 
DATA  
To test our hypotheses, plant-level data is required because the spans of control and the 
institutional configurations have to be measured at the company level2. Since we need 
detailed company data, the sample size is small and comprises 22 comparable engineering 
plants. The data was gathered in Germany, Switzerland, the UK, and the U.S. through face-to-
face interviews with personnel managers, and were supplemented with secondary data 
analysis and expert interviews. The interviews took place between April 2008 and February 
2010.  
We used a matched-pair strategy to reduce heterogeneity and to ensure the similarity 
of the products. We identified the cases by matching companies according to their 4-digit SIC 
codes, which reflect the product line and production technology. We mainly chose the major 
group 35 to include companies that manufacture industrial machinery products and have a 
high-quality production process including tasks such as turning, drilling, and grinding. In 
particular we interviewed 13 pumps and pumping equipment producing companies, and 9 
companies producing turbines, compressors and aero engines. We conducted several shop-
floor tours to ensure the similarity of the products and the production process. For an 
overview of the country and sector distribution, see Table 1. 
 
  
                                                
2 In the following, we use the terms “plant” and “company” synonymously.  
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Table 1 Number of participating companies by sector (SIC 1987) 
 
Source: GER, CH, UK, Ryan et al., 2011, Table 1; the U.S., own fieldwork 
 
We also matched companies according to their size. Using to the EU classification (European 
Commission, 2005), the sample includes 14 large companies with more than 250 employees 
(6 in Germany, 3 in Switzerland, 4 in the UK, 1 in the U.S.) and 8 medium-sized companies 
between 50 and 249 employees (3 in Switzerland, 1 in the UK, 4 in the U.S.; see Ryan et al., 
2011). 
 All plants have existed for at least 10 years. Regarding production volume and lot size, 
our sample comprises different batch sizes, from small to large batches. All plants followed a 
quality-oriented strategy, partly with engineered-to-order products.  
 
VARIABLES, METHODS AND RESULTS 
Outcome variable: Span of control 
Following classic studies on the span of control (e.g., Bell, 1967; Ouchi & Dowling, 1974), 
we measure our outcome variable, i.e., the span of control in the production area, by asking 
“how many employees (skilled and unskilled) work in production” and “how many 
supervisors and technicians work in production.” These questions were reliable for the 
interviewees to answer, as they merely had to either count the employees and supervisors in 
the production area or transfer the hierarchical structure from their internal organizational 
chart.  
 According to our hypotheses, we divide our analysis into two parts. First, we study the 
institutional settings and average spans of control at a national level, as in the VoC literature, 
to test the first two hypotheses. Second, we study the institutional configurations and spans of 
control at the company level to test hypotheses three, four, and five. 
 
National-level analysis  
To test our first two hypotheses, which focus on country-specific averages and ranges of the 
span of control, we categorize the countries according to the national institutional settings, 
Sector Subsector SIC 
1987
GER CH UK U.S.
Pumps and pumping equipment 3561 4 3 3 3
Turbines & turbine generator sets,                    
Air & gas compressors,                  
Aircraft engines & parts
3511,            
3563, 
3724 
2 3 2 2
All engineering subsectors 6 6 5 5
E
ng
in
ee
ri
ng
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identified as relevant for the fulfillment of the three functions skill foundation, skill retention, 
and trust: VET system, employment protection, coordinated wages, and employee 
representations. In measuring the institutional variables, we closely follow the original 
definitions of Hall and Soskice (2001) and previous empirical literature (e.g., Schneider & 
Paunescu, 2012; Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop, and Paunescu, 2010; Hall & Gingerich, 2009).  
 
Explanatory variables at the national level 
(1) VET system 
We follow the studies on the VoC that measure “vocational education and training” (e.g., 
Schneider & Paunescu, 2012; Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop & Paunescu, 2010) and use the 
OECD “Education at Glance” data on the number of tertiary A (academic) graduates and 
tertiary B (occupational) graduates, each measured as a percentage of the population in the 
typical graduation age (OECD, 2009f, Table A3.1/2). We decided to build a ratio to obtain a 
better impression of the relative importance of each particular path.  
 Germany has more than twice (2.3) the number of general university graduates as 
tertiary occupational graduates (23% academic, 10% occupational); in Switzerland, ratio is 
with 1.7 a little lower (31% academic, 18% occupational) compared to Germany; in the UK, 
the ratio is a little higher (2.6, 39% academic, 15% occupational). The U.S. is much higher 
with 3.7 (37% academic, 10% occupational).  
 Although this measure gives a first impression, we argue that for the engineering 
industry the qualification of “intermediate” skills at the craftsmen level are as important and, 
therefore, complement the tertiary level indicator with an indicator for the upper secondary 
level. The OECD (2009f, Table C1.4) has calculated the proportion of young people pursuing 
academic (general) or occupational (pre-vocational and vocational) programs at the upper 
secondary level. Switzerland has the highest enrollment in occupational programs (64.8%), 
followed by Germany (57.4%) and the UK (41.4%). The U.S. has a value of 100% enrollment 
in academic programs3.  
                                                
3 Though apprenticeship training exists in the U.S., it is not reflected in the statistics because “U.S. 
registered apprenticeship training programs” usually begin after graduation from upper secondary 
education (Crosby, 2002; Glover & Bilginsoy, 2005; Bilginsoy, 2003). Overall, registered 
apprenticeship training programs show only low enrollment figures. Approximately 449.000 
apprentices were registered at the end of 2003—reflecting the entire apprenticeship population of 
several cohorts—as opposed to one cohort of 2.7 million high school graduates in 2003 (Bennici, 
2004; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2004).  
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 As the VoC approach regards a strong VET system as a typical feature for a CME, we 
conclude that Germany, Switzerland, and the UK are more coordinated in terms of the VET 
system than the U.S.  
 
(2) Employment protection 
To measure the degree of employment protection, we follow previous literature which 
commonly uses the OECD index of the strictness of employment protection (OECD, 2008; 
e.g., Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop & Paunescu, 2010; Hall & Gingerich, 2009). The overall 
OECD index is comprised of three variables: protection of permanent workers against 
dismissal, regulation of temporary forms of employment, and specific requirements for 
collective dismissal. Index values range between 0 (least stringent) to 6 (most restrictive). A 
high index value represents strong barriers to (or high costs of) staff reduction through the 
termination of employment contracts.  
 As manual workers in the manufacturing industry are usually permanent (which is also 
the case in our sample), we use the index values that measure the protection of permanent 
workers and provide the overall protection index as additional information as previous studies 
often used it. The protection index values, both for permanent workers and overall, show a 
clear gap between Germany (2.85/2.63) on the one side and the U.S., the UK, and Switzerland 
on the other (0.56/0.85, 1.17/1.09, 1.19/1.77). Thus, we conclude that the U.S., the UK, and 
Switzerland are clearly more liberal than Germany regarding employment protection.  
 
(3) Collective bargaining 
We measure collective bargaining by taking into account the coverage by collective 
bargaining agreements and the level of wage centralization, again following closely previous 
literature (e.g., Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop & Paunescu, 2010; Hall & Gingerich, 2009).  
 The majority of employees in Germany are covered by collective bargaining (63% in 
2007, Visser, 2009), and the predominant level of bargaining centralization is at the sectoral 
or regional level—with additional local- and company-level bargaining (Visser, 2009). In 
contrast, in the U.S., wage bargaining takes place predominantly at the plant level, and the 
coverage by collective agreements is very low, with only 13.5% coverage in 2007. The UK 
and Switzerland take the middle positions. In Switzerland, 48% of employees were covered 
by collective bargaining in 2007. The dominant level of bargaining is at the sectoral or 
regional level—with additional local- and company-level bargaining, as it is the case in 
Germany. In the UK, wage bargaining at the plant level dominates, and the coverage by 
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collective agreements was approximately 35% in 2007 (Visser, 2009). In sum, we categorize 
Germany as coordinated, the U.S. as liberal, and Switzerland and the UK as lying in between. 
 
(4) Employee representation  
To measure employee representation, we cannot follow previous empirical VoC-literature, as 
this variable has not been included yet. We, therefore, decided to, use the comparative indexes 
of Visser (2009), which reflect the existence and influence of employee representation at the 
national level.   
 The first index measures whether an employee representation at the enterprise, firm, or 
establishment level (above a threshold of 50 employees) is mandatory by law or by 
agreements between the central organizations of trade unions and employers’ associations; the 
index also reflects the coverage of employee representation.  
 In Germany and the UK, employee representation is, according to Visser (2009), 
assured by law or agreement; the coverage, however, is higher in Germany (75% or more of 
eligible firms, index value of 2) than in the UK (less than 75% of eligible firms, index value 
of 1). According to Visser’s index (2009), the employee representation in the U.S. and 
Switzerland is absent or voluntary, existing only in some sectors and firms (coverage of less 
than 25%, index value of 0).  
 The second index of Visser (2009) measures the influence and rights of employee 
representations. While German employee representations have the most influence, with their 
codetermination rights (index value 3), employee representations in the UK have only 
information rights (index value 1). The U.S. and Switzerland both have the lowest index value 
(0) because employee representations are either nonexistent or have no rights at all. 
 Therefore, we again find Germany and the U.S. at polar ends, with the UK again lying 
somewhere in between and with a strong tendency to the liberal side in Switzerland. 
 Taking all four institutional variables together (Table 2), two polar cases of liberal and 
coordinated shape exist (the U.S. and Germany), which are characterized by coherent 
institutional settings in terms of the dimensions of the VET systems, employment protection, 
wage coordination, and employee representation. Switzerland and—in contrast to previous 
literature (e.g., Kenworthy, 2006; Schneider & Paunescu, 2012)—the UK build the less 
coherent cases because both of these countries combine more coordinated with more liberal 
institutions relevant for the span of control. While both countries have low employment 
protection, Switzerland has a strong VET system, which is also existent in the UK (at least 
numerically, quality differences are discussed below). Switzerland is more coordinated in the 
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wage coordination dimension than the UK but has less employee representation. Therefore, 
we situate these two countries as mixed cases between the two polar cases Germany and the 
U.S. 
 
Table 2 Overview of national-level institutions 
 
Graduation tertiary level: Ratio of tertiary A (academic) graduates (measured as a percentage of the population 
in the typical graduation age) and tertiary B (occupational) graduates (measured as a percentage of the 
population in the typical graduation age) 
Enrollment pattern secondary level: Percentage of young people pursuing occupational (pre-vocational and 
vocational) programs at the upper secondary level.  
Employment protection permanent workers: Dismissal protection of workers with regular contracts 
incorporates (i) procedural inconveniences that employers face when starting the dismissal process, such as 
notification and consultation requirements; (ii) notice periods and severance pay, which typically vary by 
tenure of the employee; and (iii) difficulty of dismissal, as determined by the circumstances in which it is 
possible to dismiss workers, and the repercussions for the employer if a dismissal is found to be unfair (such as 
compensation and reinstatement), scale from 0 (least stringent) to 6 (most restrictive) 
Employment protection overall: Compiled from 21 items covering three different aspects of employment 
protection: Individual dismissal of workers with regular contracts, additional costs for collective dismissals, 
and regulation of temporary contracts equivalent workers in the user firm, which can increase the cost of using 
temporary agency workers relative to hiring workers on permanent contracts, scale from 0 (least stringent) to 6 
(most restrictive) 
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Level of bargaining: Dominant level at which wage bargaining takes place 
Collective bargaining coverage: Employees covered by collective pay bargaining as a percentage of those with 
the right to coverage 
Existence of employee representation: Employee representation (at enterprise, firm, or establishment levels, 
above the threshold of 50 employees) is assigned a rating as follows: 2, mandatory, based on public law, and/or 
assured on the basis of an enforceable central or basic agreement between the central organizations of the trade 
unions and the employers’ associations, and coverage of eligible firms is 75% or more; 1, is mandatory, based 
on public law, and or assured on the basis of an enforceable central or basic agreement between the central 
organizations of trade unions and employers’ associations, but coverage is lower than 75% of eligible firms; 0, 
is absent or voluntary, and covers only some sectors or firms (less than 25% of firms above 50 employee 
threshold) 
Rights of employee representation: 3, codetermination of company economic policies; 2, major consultation 
rights over social policies; 1, information rights; 0, no representation or no rights 
Sources: OECD (2009f), OECD (2008), Visser (2009) 
 
Results at the national level 
The analysis at the national level of the matched-pair engineering plants in the four countries 
shows that the average span of control differs between the four countries. While our U.S. 
companies show the narrowest average span of control with, on average only 7.1 employees 
per supervisor in the production area, German companies have on average the broadest span 
of control with 26 employees per supervisor (Table 3, row one). These results support our 
first hypothesis that companies in a coherently liberal market economy have a narrower span 
of control than those in a coherently coordinated market economy. It also supports the 
findings of previous comparative studies that the span of control is an important mechanism 
of adjustment to different institutional settings (e.g. Maurice, Sorge & Warner, 1980; 
Maurice, Sellier & Silvestre, 1986). 
 
Table 3 Span of control in matched-pair engineering companies in the U.S., Germany, the 
UK, and Switzerland 
 
Note: Span of control is defined as number of employees per supervisor in production 
Source: own calculation 
 
In every country, we find variation in the span of control (Table 3, rows 2 and 3). In 
companies in the coherent LME, the span of control varies only within a range of around 10 
employees per supervisor (range from minimum to maximum is 10.1 in the U.S.). In 
companies in mixed market economies, the range is much broader and varies between 19.5 in 
country U.S. UK CH GER
average
span of control
max 13.0 23.6 29.5 53.7
min 2.9 4.1 5.5 17.6
range          
(max-min)
7.1 10.3 13.6 26.0
10.1 19.5 24.0 36.1
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the UK and 24.0 in Switzerland. In the coherent CME, we find the broadest range from 
minimum to maximum (36.1 in Germany).  
 For a formal analysis of the cases, we cluster our data points.4. Figure 1 (dendrogram in 
the upper part) shows that we find two clusters: One cluster includes “broad” spans of control 
which ranges from 17.6 to 53.7, and one cluster includes “narrow” spans of control which 
ranges from 2.9 to 13. When analyzing the origin of companies that belong to the two clusters 
(Figure 1, lower part), we find that all German, two Swiss and one UK companies belong to 
the cluster of broad spans of control and that all U.S., five Swiss and four UK companies 
belong to the cluster of narrow spans of control.  
 
Figure 1 Cluster analysis of spans of control 
 
Source: own calculations 
Notes to the lower part: 
Each abbreviation represents one company, e.g., US-3 is company number 3 in the United States.  
Each row shows companies in a particular country: first row companies in the U.S., second row companies in the 
UK, third row companies in Switzerland, fourth row companies in Germany 
 
                                                
4 We use Ward’s linkage-method, which minimizes the sum of squares of any two (hypothetical) 
clusters that can be formed at each step. 
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In sum, the cluster analysis shows that in Germany no company has a span of control, which 
is close to the spans of control of U.S. companies (U.S. companies are in the first row and are 
all on the left hand side; German companies are in the fourth row and are all on the right hand 
side). The medium average spans of control in Switzerland and the UK derive from a 
combination of companies that have either a span of control that is close to German 
companies (CH-5, CH-4, UK-5). Or they have a span of control that is close to U.S. 
companies (all other companies on the left hand side). Therefore, our results support the 
second hypothesis that companies in mixed market economies (Switzerland and the UK) 
show more variation in the span of control than companies in coherent market economies (the 
U.S. and Germany). The different spans of control (broad and narrow) within the same 
country give a first hint that companies have a strategic choice in adjusting to mixed national 
institutions with their company-level institutions. 
 
Company-level analysis 
We expect that companies have different possibilities of how to adjust to national institutional 
settings with their company-level institutions to achieve a coherent configuration of 
institutions. We, therefore, need a method that allows the identification of complete 
configurations (combinations) of institutions. As traditional regression methods cannot—or 
only in a limited way via interaction effects—take into account different configurations, we 
use the method of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). 
 
Methodology: fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis  
To reveal in detail which configuration of institutional variables is linked to a broad or narrow 
span of control, we apply the configurational method “qualitative comparative analysis” 
(QCA, Ragin, 1987; Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). This method has already proven useful for 
testing VoC propositions (e.g., Kogut & Ragin, 2006; Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop & 
Paunescu, 2010). It is also particularly useful for conducting cross-country comparisons (e.g., 
Ebbinghaus & Visser, 1999), has been used to analyze strategic management questions (e.g., 
Greckhamer et al., 2008), and has been designed for formally analyzing qualitative evidence 
and small data sets. 
 The underlying principle of QCA is to treat every observation as a configuration, i.e. a 
combination of well-defined institutional variables. To use this method, the dependent and 
independent measures are calibrated into sets by defining full membership (value of 1), full 
nonmembership (value of 0), and a crossover point (value of 0.5) of maximum ambiguity 
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regarding membership. This information is then summarized in a truth table and reduced with 
Boolean logic. The resulting statements indicate whether single or combinations of variables 
are necessary and sufficient. This approach thus allows a formal analysis of qualitative 
information using small data sets. Moreover, fsQCA gives insights into whether multiple 
configurations (combinations of institutional variables) are associated with the same outcome 
(equifinality; Fiss, 2007) and allows the measurement of “coverage” (the relative importance 
of different paths to an outcome) and “consistency” (the proportion of cases consistent with 
the pattern). The following subsection describes the calibration of the variables that we use in 
the fsQCA. 
 
Calibration of the outcome variable 
To use the fsQCA, we need to calibrate our dependent variable between 0 and 1. In addition, 
we need a crossover point between a broad and a narrow span of control. No predefined 
values exist, neither for a “fully broad” or a “fully narrow” span of control nor for the 
crossover point Therefore, we use our cluster analysis results and define the crossover point at 
the value of 15.3, the middle between the boarders of the two clusters “broad span of control” 
and “narrow span of control” (Figure 1). The value for being fully in the set of a broad span of 
control is 53.7, the value for being fully out of the set of a broad span of control is 2.9.  
 
Institutional variables at the company level and their calibration 
We also need to calibrate the data on company-level institutions that are used to ensure skill 
foundation, skill retention, and trust. In the following, we describe how we measure (Table 4) 
and calibrated these company-level variables between 0 and 1. 
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Table 4 Functionally equivalent institutions at the national and the company level 
 
 
(1) High-quality vocational training 
We measure directly the existence and quality of the vocational training within the company 
and calibrate the variable between 0 and 1 by defining four categories:  
• fully in the set of high-quality vocational training (value of 1) are companies that 
train their young workers in a way comparable to a high-quality apprenticeship 
program which is regulated by high and externally-set standards, takes several 
years of training (3.5 years or more) and includes both school- and company-
based training, as existent in Germany and Switzerland.  
• in the set of high-quality vocational training but not “fully in” (value of 0.66) are 
companies that provide their young workers a vocational training which shows 
not all but at least many characteristics of the Germanic style of apprenticeship 
training. In the UK, for example, Apprenticeship training in the traditional 
apprenticeship sectors such as engineering is in several aspects comparable to 
the high quality apprenticeship training found in Germany and Switzerland: 
Sector Skills Councils determine the Apprenticeship training content and the 
skill requirements, the Advanced Apprenticeship takes around 3 years, and 
apprentices receive both college- and company-based training  
• out of the set of high-quality vocational but not “fully out” (value of 0.33) are 
companies that provide their young workers only short (usually only a few 
Function Variables measured at the 
national level
Variables measured at the 
company level
Skill foundation
Relative importance of 
vocational training system 
(OECD graduation and 
enrolment data)
High-quality vocational      
training provided by                  
the company                        
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Skill retention
Employment Protection      
(OECD indexes)
Share of supervisors          
internally recruited                        
Coverage and centralization of 
wage bargaining                 
(Visser, 2009)
Covered by an external and   
wage-relevant collective 
bargaining agreement       
Trust
Existence and rights of employee 
representation (Visser, 2009)
Strong employee          
representation at the                
plant level                               
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weeks), on-the-job, and only company-specific vocational training as usually the 
case in the U.S.   
• fully out of the set of high-quality vocational training (value of 0) are companies 
that do not train at all their young workers 
 
(2) Employment protection and internal labor markets 
With our interview data, we measure directly the strength of the internal labor markets using 
the shares of internal promotion to the supervisory level. A closer look at the recruitment 
behavior at the supervisory level in all four countries illustrates that some companies, even in 
countries with low employment protection (e.g., the U.S.), recruit the majority (more than 
50%) of their supervisors internally (Table 5). 
 
Table 5 Percent of supervisor positions filled by internal candidates 
  
Data source: GER, CH, UK, Ryan et al., 2011, Table 14; the U.S., own fieldwork 
The question for the general recruitment strategy was: “How do you typically fill your vacancies for production 
supervisors?” 
 
To categorize companies according to their degree of employment protection, we calibrate 
companies with strong internal labor markets, thus a 100 percent share of internal promotions, 
as full membership in strong internal labor markets (value of 1). If none of the supervisors is 
recruited internally, we code this as full nonmembership in strong internal labor markets 
(value of 0). Companies with a 50 percent share of internal promotions receive the crossover 
point value of 0.5. 
 
(3) Wage coordination 
We measure directly whether a company is covered by an external, wage-relevant collective 
bargaining agreement. For the calibration of wage coordination between 0 and 1, we use three 
categories: 
• fully in the set of wage coordination (value of 1) are companies with a wage-
relevant collective bargaining agreement that was negotiated at the industry level 
US-1 100 UK-1 96 CH-1 25 GER-1 80
US-2 35 UK-2 90 CH-2 0 GER-2 80
US-3 99 UK-3 90 CH-3 50 GER-3 90
US-4 5 UK-4 80 CH-4 90 GER-4 80
US-5 100 UK-5 85 CH-5 60 GER-5 80
CH-6 20 GER-6 60
U.S. UK CH GER
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• out of the set of high-quality vocational  but not “fully out” (value of 0.33) are 
companies that are covered by collective agreements at the industry level which 
do not include (binding) wage agreements 
• fully out of the set of wage coordination (value of 0) are companies that are not 
covered by externally negotiated wage agreements 
 
(4) Employee representation 
Finally, we measure directly whether an employee representation exists within the company. 
For employee representation, we chose three categories to calibrate the variable between 0 
and 1: 
• fully in the set of employee representation (value of 1) are companies whose 
employee representations have legally binding codetermination rights, such as 
German works councils 
• in the set of employee representation but not “fully in” (value of 0.66) are 
companies that have an employee representation that participate informally or 
have information rights 
• fully out of the set of employee representation (value of 0) are companies that 
have no employee representation at all 
 
Results at the company level 
Table 6 summarizes the company-level institutional configurations in our sample. In contrast 
to the measurements of institutional variables at the national level, company-level 
measurement allows us to identify various configurations of institutional variables also within 
countries.  
 
Table 6 Company-level institutional configurations in the sample 
 Data source: GER, CH, UK, Ryan et al., 2011, Table 14; the U.S., own fieldwork 
 
U.S. UK CH GER
A 1 1 0 1 3 1 2
B 1 1 1 1 6 6
C 1 0 0 0 1 1
D 0 0 0 0 2 2
E 1 1 0 0 4 4
F 1 0 0 1 3 3
G 0 1 0 0 3 3
N
Number of companies in 
countriesconfigu-
ration
High-Quality 
Vocational 
Training
Internal 
Recruitment of 
Supervisors
Wage    
Bargaining
Empl. Represen-
tation
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Overall, we find seven different configurations in our sample. All six German companies 
show the same configuration of institutional variables, namely high-quality vocational 
training, strong internal labor markets, wage coordination and employee representations 
(Table 6, configuration B). All U.S. companies have no high-quality vocational training, no 
wage coordination and no employee representation. We find variation in the internal labor 
market variable, three U.S. companies have strong internal labor markets (Table 6, 
configuration G), two have weaker ones (Table 6, configuration D).  In the UK, all companies 
have high-quality vocational training, strong internal labor markets, and no wage 
coordination. Again, we find variation in one variable.  One company has an employee 
representation (Table 6, configuration A). Finally, we find variation in two variables in 
Switzerland. While all companies have a high-quality vocational training and no wage 
coordination, we find companies with (Table 6, configurations A and F) and without 
employee representation (Table 6, configuration C) and companies with (Table 6, 
configuration A) and without a strong internal labor market (Table 6, configurations C and F). 
Therefore, we cannot reject our third hypothesis that companies in less coherent market 
economies show more company-level institutional configurations than companies in more 
coherent market economies.  
 To analyze our fourth hypothesis that only a coherently coordinated configuration of 
institutional variables is associated with a broad span of control, we now use the QCA 
analysis. According to the truth table, two institutional configurations (Table 7, configurations 
A and B) are consistently associated with a broad span of control.  
 
Table 7 Truth table company analysis—institutional configurations associated with a broad 
span of control   
 
Data source: GER, CH, UK, Ryan et al., 2011, Table 14; the U.S., own fieldwork 
 
After reduction using Boolean algebra (see Table 8), the results suggest that one institutional 
configuration is associated with a broad span of control: high-quality vocational training, 
employee representation, and high internal recruitment of supervisors.   
 
A 1 1 0 1 3 1 0.8498 0.8031
B 1 1 1 1 6 1 0.8101 0.7376
C 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.3408 0.1020
D 0 0 0 0 2 0 0.3357 0.0000
E 1 1 0 0 4 0 0.2802 0.1359
F 1 0 0 1 3 0 0.2037 0.1063
G 0 1 0 0 3 0 0.1584 0.0553
H 0 0 0 0 2 1 1.000 1.000
I 0 1 0 0 3 1 0.9506 0.9446
J 1 0 0 0 1 1 0.9250 0.8979
K 1 0 0 1 3 1 0.9052 0.8936
L 1 1 0 0 4 1 0.8867 0.8640
M 1 1 0 1 3 0 0.3873 0.1968
N 1 1 1 1 6 0 0.3124 0.0495
PRI 
consistency
Wage 
Bargaining
Configurations of 
company-level 
inst. variables
Configurations of 
company-level 
inst. variables
High-quality 
Vocational 
Training
Internal 
Recruitment of 
Supervisors
High-quality 
Vocational 
Training
Internal 
Recruitment of 
Supervisors
Wage 
Bargaining
Empl. 
Represen-
tation
raw          
consistency
N
Outcome              
Broad span of 
control
raw          
consistency
PRI 
consistency
Empl. 
Represen-
tation
N
Outcome              
Narrow span of 
control
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Table 8 Results QCA analysis at the company level – broad span of control 
  
Notes: 
Raw coverage measures the proportion of memberships in the outcome explained by each term of the solution.  
Unique coverage measures the proportion of memberships in the outcome explained solely by each individual 
solution term (memberships that are not covered by other solution terms).  
Consistency measures the degree to which membership in each solution term is a subset of the outcome.  
Solution coverage measures the proportion of memberships in the outcome that is explained by the complete 
solution. 
Solution consistency measures the degree to which membership in the solution (the set of solution terms) is a 
subset of membership in the outcome 
 
The configuration of the three institutional variables represents all three functions that were 
theoretically identified and suggests that the complementary existence of all three functions is 
necessary to be able to work with a broad span of control in a company. High-quality 
vocational training ensures the necessary skill foundation for a broad span of control. Strong 
internal labor markets ensure a high stock of company-specific knowledge and the retention 
of skills within the company. Finally, employee representation increases trust between 
management and employees. Even when these employee representations are weak compared 
to, for example, German works councils, as they have no legal co-determination rights, they 
appear to increase trust, thus reducing the need for tight supervision. We, therefore, cannot 
reject our fourth hypothesis that only companies with a coherently coordinated company-level 
institutional configuration show a broad span of control. The presence or absence of the 
institution “wage coordination” has no influence on the result.  
 Moreover, we find that companies in mixed national-level institutional settings can end 
up with a broad span of control when they use the coordinated institutions that are available 
and substitute national-level liberal institutions with company-level coordinated institutions. 
Thus, companies in mixed market economies can compensate for low employment protection 
and legally non-required employee representations by having strong internal labor markets 
and a company-level form of employee representation.  
 
Broad span of control
Apprenticeship training !
Internal recruitment of supervisors !
Wage coordination at industry level
Employee Representation !
Consistency 0.826
Raw/Unique Coverage 0.853/0.853
Solution Coverage/Consistency 0.853/0.826
! = Condition present " = Condition absent
Configuration 1 Configuration 2
Apprentices i  tr i i
Internal recruit t  "
age coordi ti   " "
E ployee e r s t "
Consistency 1.0 1.0
Ra / nique r 0.31/0.23 0.76/0.69
Solution o er /
 = Condition present #= Condition present
Narrow span of control
1.0/1.0
High-quality voc t o al training
 it t  i
 r i ti  t i tr  l l
ployee epresentation
Consistency
Raw/Unique Coverage
Solution Coverage/Consistency
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To test our fifth hypothesis, we analyze the configurations of company-level institutional 
variables that are associated with a narrow span of control. Five combinations are consistently 
associated with a narrow span of control (Table 9, configurations H to L).  
 
Table 9 Truth table company analysis—institutional configurations associated with a narrow 
span of control 
 Data source: GER, CH, UK, Ryan et al., 2011, Table 14; the U.S., own fieldwork 
 
Again, these configurations can be reduced by Boolean algebra (see Table 10) with the result 
that two configurations are associated with a narrow span of control:  
a) high-quality vocational training, non-existent wage coordination, and weak internal labor 
markets and  
b) non-existent employee representation and non-existent wage coordination.  
 
Table 10 Results of QCA analysis at the company level – narrow span of control 
 
Notes: see Table 9 
 
The results suggest that even if not all company-level institutional variables are liberal 
companies will still show a narrow span of control. Regarding our fifth hypothesis, we 
therefore find no evidence that company-level institutional variables all need to have a liberal 
shape to be associated with a narrow span of control. Instead companies show already a 
narrow span of control, when only one function is missing.  
A 1 1 0 1 3 1 0.8498 0.8031
B 1 1 1 1 6 1 0.8101 0.7376
C 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.3408 0.1020
D 0 0 0 0 2 0 0.3357 0.0000
E 1 1 0 0 4 0 0.2802 0.1359
F 1 0 0 1 3 0 0.2037 0.1063
G 0 1 0 0 3 0 0.1584 0.0553
H 0 0 0 0 2 1 1.000 1.000
I 0 1 0 0 3 1 0.9506 0.9446
J 1 0 0 0 1 1 0.9250 0.8979
K 1 0 0 1 3 1 0.9052 0.8936
L 1 1 0 0 4 1 0.8867 0.8640
M 1 1 0 1 3 0 0.3873 0.1968
N 1 1 1 1 6 0 0.3124 0.0495
PRI 
consistency
Wage 
Bargaining
Configurations of 
company-level 
inst. variables
Configurations of 
company-level 
inst. variables
High-quality 
Vocational 
Training
Internal 
Recruitment of 
Supervisors
High-quality 
Vocational 
Training
Internal 
Recruitment of 
Supervisors
Wage 
Bargaining
Empl. 
Represen-
tation
raw          
consistency
N
Outcome              
Broad span of 
control
raw          
consistency
PRI 
consistency
Empl. 
Represen-
tation
N
Outcome              
Narrow span of 
control
Configuration 1 Configuration 2
Apprenticeship training !
Internal recruitment of supervisors "
Wage coordination at industry level " "
Employee Representation "
Consistency 0.943 0.902
Raw/Unique Coverage 0.235/0.060 0.749/0.574
Solution Coverage/Consistency
! = Condition present " = Condition absent
Narrow span of control
0.809/0.909
Configuration 1 Configuration 2
Apprenticeship training !
Internal recruitment of supervisors
age coordination at industry level "
E ployee epresentation "
Consistency 1.0 1.0
Ra / nique 0.31/ .23 0.76/0.69
Solution o er /
 = Condition present #= Condition present
Narrow span of control
1.0/1.0
High-quality vocational training
ternal recruitment of supervisors
 ordination at industry level
loy e Representation
sistency
/ nique Coverage
l tion Coverage/Consistency
Configuration 1 Configuration 2
Apprenticeship training !
Internal recruitment of supervisors "
Wage coordination at industry level " "
Employee Representation "
Consistency 1.0 1.0
Raw/Unique Coverage 0.31/0.23 0.76/0.69
Solution Coverage/Consistency
! = Condition present #= Condition present
Narrow span of contro
1.0/1.0
Configuration 1 Configuration 2
Apprenticeship training !
Internal recruitme t of supervisors
Wage coordination at industry level "
Employee Representation "
Consistency 1.0 1.0
Raw/U ique Cov rage 0.31/0.23 0.76/0.69
Solutio  C verage/Consistency
! = C ndition present #= Condition present
Narrow span of control
1.0/1.0
Configuration 1 Configuration 2
Apprenticeship training !
Internal recruitment of supervisors
Wage coordination at industry level "
Employee Representation "
Consistency 1.0 1.0
Raw/Unique Coverage 0.31/0.23 0.76/0.69
Solution Coverage/Co sistency
! = Condition present #= Condition present
Narrow span of control
1.0/1.0
Configuration 1 Configuration 2
Apprenticeship training !
Internal recruitment of supervisors
Wage coordination t industry level
Employee Representation "
Consistency 1.0 1.0
Raw/U ique Cov rage 0.31/0.23 0.76/0.69
Solution Coverage/Co sistency
! = Condition present #= Condition present
Narrow span of control
1.0/1.0
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper analyzes the question of how matched-pair engineering companies adjust to more 
or less favorable and more or less coherent national institutional settings. We argue that the 
span of control is an important mechanism of adjustment. The presence of three functions, 
namely skill foundation, skill retention, and trust is associated with a broad span of control 
and the shape of the national institutional setting determines whether these three functions are 
fulfilled.  
 Using the U.S. and Germany as examples for coherent national institutional settings, we 
find that matched-pair engineering companies adjust their span of control of production 
supervisors to the national-level institutional setting. Production supervisors in companies in a 
coherent CME (Germany) have, on average, a broader span of control than production 
supervisors in companies producing in a coherent LME (the U.S.). These results are 
consistent with the argument of the VoC approach, that U.S. companies fit the institutional 
setting by relying on hierarchies and rules, and German companies fit the institutional setting 
by relying on cooperation (Hall & Soskice, 2001).  
 In mixed national institutional settings (the UK and Switzerland), companies show a 
broader range in the span of control than their counterparts in the more coherent countries. 
Companies in Germany and the U.S. build relatively consistent clusters of a broad and a 
narrow span of control, respectively. In less coherent countries, however, we find companies 
that have either a broad or a narrow span of control. Therefore, we argue that companies have 
not only the span of control as mechanism of adjustment but also the strategic choice of how 
to shape the company-level institutional setting. Using company-level functionally equivalent 
institutions, companies can complement or substitute functions that are provided by national-
level institutions and are thus able to end up with either a broad or a narrow span of control, 
depending on the company-level institutional setting.  
 By measuring the functionally equivalent institutions at the company level, we are able 
to identify the strategic choice of companies and the institutional diversity that is hidden 
beneath the macro-institutional evidence (Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop & Paunescu, 2010). 
With the QCA analysis, we link the company-level institutional variables to the span of 
control. The results suggest that a broad span of control is only associated with the presence 
of high-quality vocational training, strong internal labor markets, and employee representation 
as only this configuration ensures the functions of skill foundation, skill retention, and trust 
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between management and employees. One or more missing functions result in a narrow span 
of control.  
 Our study is, of course, limited by the small number of cases within each country. 
While we address the problems of size with a method suitable for small numbers and rich 
contexts, our results could be driven by limited diversity. The result that wage coordination at 
the industry level is not necessary for a broad span of control seems plausible, as the wage-
equalizing effects of tariff agreements seem, even in Germany, weaker than theory implies 
(also tariff companies can and do pay higher wages than agreed). However, the importance of 
non-existent wage coordination for a narrow span of control is likely due to the limited 
diversity in our sample because this is the only variable that strictly separates the German 
cases from the cases in the other countries. 
 We also cannot provide representative evidence for all engineering companies in each 
country. For example, our company sample does not include a U.S. company with high-
quality vocational training, even though high-quality programs such as “registered 
apprenticeship training programs” exist in the U.S. engineering industry (Crosby, 2002; 
Glover & Bilginsoy, 2005; Bilginsoy, 2003). Future research should include these types of 
cases to analyze whether registered apprenticeship is associated with a broad span of control 
in U.S. companies.  
 A further limitation could be that we do not consider additional factors that could 
explain—according to economic and organizational literature—the span of control. An 
example is the complexity of tasks, which is influenced by technology. By matching 
companies by product and production technology, we aimed to reduce technological 
influences. Nevertheless, the possibility exists that the companies we studied vary in the type 
of work organization. A wider span of control is associated with, among other things, stable 
and routine work and subordinates who perform similar work tasks (e.g., Woodward, 1965; 
Burns & Stalker, 1961; Mintzberg, 1979). Moreover, the introduction of teamwork or lean 
production could influence organizational structure. For example, German companies might 
have fewer supervisors because they have introduced more teamwork than their foreign 
counterparts. Previous literature, however, shows that a change in work organization has only 
a limited effect on the number of supervisors. While supervisors’ tasks by themselves may 
change, the introduction of e.g., teamwork does not necessarily lead to a significant increase 
of the span of control of supervisors, again the level of “skill foundation” is of relevance here 
(Mason, 2000). Furthermore, the possibility of introducing routine work is limited in 
companies that rely on engineering-to-order. The solution for these companies would be to 
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introduce a large number of supervisors who break down job tasks for their subordinates. The 
narrow span of control in the U.S. companies supports this explanation. 
 Though various limitations exist, this paper contributes both to the theoretical and 
empirical literature on organizational adjustment strategies to national institutional settings. 
The theoretical section of this paper integrates different strands of literature on macro-level 
political economy and micro-level organizational designs. We derive theoretically that 
companies can adjust via their span of control and that three functions are relevant for the 
span of control. Besides showing that the span of control is indeed an important adjustment 
mechanism, we provide evidence that companies are not fully dependent on whether the 
national institutional fulfills the three functions. Instead companies have some strategic 
leeway in terms of their company-level institutional setting thus being able to determine the 
presence of the three functions. Therefore, our results have also practice-relevant 
implications. Multinational companies, for example, that originate in a country with a strong 
apprenticeship tradition and wish to expand their production to countries without a high-
quality vocational training system face a major problem in how to deal with the lack of a 
skilled workforce. Our results show that the company’s adjustment strategy could be either to 
follow the national institutional setting and to implement of a narrow span of control or to 
create a company-level institutional setting with high-quality vocational training combined 
with strong internal labor markets and trust-building institutions thus ending up with a broad 
span of control.  
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